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ABSTRACT: Building upon the role values take in Walton’s theory of practical reasoning, this paper 
will frame the question of how values should be evaluated into the broader question of what 
reasonable practical argumentation is. The thesis argued for is that if a positive evaluation of 
practical reasoning argumentation requires that the argument avoid a morally negative conclusion, 
then the role of values should be given a central, rather than supportive, position in practical 
argument evaluation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Speaking of virtue, Aristotle explains that, “it is a mean between two vices, that 
which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean 
because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions 
and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate.” 
(1106b36-1107a8) Applying the notion of a virtuous mean to notions of human 
thinking, on one extreme, that of the defect, we have irrationality. In regards to 
practical reasoning, a prime example of irrationality occurs in “cases in which a 
person judges that considerations are reasons but then fails to take them into 
account in deciding what to do, or fails to give them the weight that he or she judges 
them to have.” (Scanlon, 1998, p. 30) On the other extreme, that of excess, we have 
the rational or perhaps better, “ideally rational”. The vision of the “rational person” 
Tindale (1999, p. 40) illustrates, “separates the reason from other human faculties, 
and inaugurates a being who functions as a machine, insensible to her or his 
humanity and to the reactions of others.” Characterizing the ideally rational person 
Scanlon (1998) argues that “[a] full account of what an “ideally rational” agent 
would do could involve at least three possible dimensions of idealization, in the 
directions of (1) possession of full information about one’s situation and the 
consequences of possible lines of action, (2) awareness of the full range of reasons 
that apply to someone in that situation, and (3) flawless reasoning about what these 
reasons support.” (p. 32) In light of the conference theme this year, “The Virtues of 
Argumentation,” in what follows, the discussion is meant to be situated not in the 
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context of rational, machine-like reasoning, and it is also hoped that it does not 
appear to be completely irrational. Rather, the aim is for the discussion to be 
situated in, and address, that place “[i]n between the minimum standards marked 
out by the idea of irrationality and the ideal of what it would be (most) rational to 
believe or do, [where we find] the notions of what is reasonable and unreasonable.” 
(Scanlon, 1998, p. 32) 
 The second connection I hope to make to the conference theme is by 
discussing a topic commonly connected to moral and ethical philosophy; practical 
reasoning. More specifically, what follows will be a discussion of some of the ways 
that moral values participate in human practical reasoning while focusing on some 
of the (problems with) ways to evaluate it.1 It is hoped that by the end of the paper I 
will have made the case that values need to play a central, rather than supportive, 
role in practical reasoning evaluation. Through this discussion, I also hope to 
contribute to thinking about how reasoning and argumentation relate to “doing the 
right thing,” an expression which is often used as a characterization of what it 
means to live virtuously (Annas, 2004). 
 In light of these aims, I will next provide a brief characterization of practical 
reasoning by distinguishing between its instrumental and value forms. Following 
this characterization I will narrow in on proposals for the evaluation of value 
practical reasoning by focusing on Walton’s (2007) essay “Evaluating Practical 
Reasoning”. In the fourth section, I will provide an example of value practical 
reasoning used to draw an immoral conclusion which will be analyzed in section 5. 
Section 6 will provide a discussion of developments provided by Fariclough and 
Fairclough which are shown to be very useful, but ultimately still in need of further 
development. Section 7 will point to one proposal, developed by T.M. Scanlon, which 
might be used to fill an important gap between the reasonable and the moral. 
Finally, in section 8 I will provide the conclusions of the study as it has progressed 
thus far. 
 
2. CHARACTERIZATIONS OF PRACTICAL REASONING 
 
Practical reasoning is commonly contrasted with theoretical reasoning, wherein, 
broadly, the latter concerns reasoning about beliefs, and the former concerns 
reasoning about actions. Although characterizations of practical reasoning differ in 
their presentation, they all maintain roughly the same general form, even when 
originating from the differing Commitment Model and Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) 
Model. For example, Walton (2007), from the commitment camp, provides the 
following basic scheme: 
  
I have a goal G.  
Bringing about A is necessary (or sufficient) for me to bring about G. 
Therefore, I should (practically ought to) bring about A. (p. 233) 
 
John Broome (2004), a main proponent from the BDI camp, articulates a description 
                                                        
1 I will only focus on moral values, broadly construed.  
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of practical reasoning as the following; 
 
I(Chris will buy a boat)  
and B(For Chris to buy a boat, a necessary means is for Chris to borrow money)  
so I(Chris will borrow money). 
 
Where I stands for “you intend that” and B stands for “you believe that”. (p. 2) 
 
While there are interesting questions concerning the differences between 
these two presentations, the comparison here is only meant to illustrate that despite 
their differences, both approaches seem at heart to be after the same thing; an 
explanation of how people reason about what to do.  
 This basic outline of practical reasoning is commonly referred to as 
instrumental practical reasoning. In addition to instrumental reasoning, scholars 
from both camps have noted that practical reasoning often has a close and 
important connection with values.2 Walton (2007) argues that, “[v]alues are often in 
the background in practical reasoning, or in some cases may not need to be taken 
into account at all. For these cases the basic scheme can be used to evaluate the 
practical reasoning. In other cases, like those typical in electronic democracy, values 
are important factors that need to be taken into account.” (p. 234) In cases of value-
based practical reasoning, Walton adds a value aspect to his basic scheme and 
presents it as; 
 
I have a goal G. 
G is supported by my set of values, V. 
Bringing about A is necessary (or sufficient) for me to bring about G. 
Therefore, I should (practically ought to) bring about A. (p. 234) 
 
3. EVALUATION STRATEGIES 
 
There is far more literature focused on describing and discussing the nature of 
practical reasoning than there is on suggesting ways to evaluate it.3 Walton (2007), 
however, has suggested that there are three ways practical reasoning can be 
evaluated: “The first is to attack one of the premises of the argumentation scheme, 
arguing that the premise has not been adequately justified. The second is to attempt 
to undercut the argument by asking critical questions. The third is to mount a 
counter-argument designed to rebut (refute) the original argument from practical 
reasoning” (p. 223). He is clear, however, that “[t]he basic device to be used in all 
cases is the set of critical questions matching the practical reasoning.” (p. 231)4 
                                                        
2 From the commitment camp, see: Walton (2007), Atkinson & Bench-Capon (2008), and Fairclough 
& Fairclough (2012). From the BDI camp, see: Bratman (1987) and Broome (2004). Some other 
important views, which do not explicitly align themselves with one camp or the other, are presented 
by Audi (2006) and Scanlon (1998). 
3 This is true especially for BDI articulations. Although, in addition to Walton (2007) see Audi (2004, 
2006), Fairclough & Fairclough (2012), and Atkinson & Bench-Capon (2008) for some important 
exceptions from the commitment camp. 
4 As the basic device, in this paper, I will only focus on the critical questions.  
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Walton’s critical questions for value-based practical reasoning are: 
 
(CQ1)  What other goals do I have that might conflict with G? 
(CQ2)  How well is G supported by (or at least consistent with) my values V? 
(CQ3)  What alternative actions5 to my bringing about A that would also bring 
about G should be considered? 
(CQ4)  Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the 
best of the whole set, in light of considerations of efficiency in bringing 
about G? 
(CQ5)  Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the 
best of the whole set, in light of my values V? 
(CQ6)  What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically possible for me to 
bring about A? 
(CQ7)  What consequences of my bringing about A that might have even greater 
negative value than the positive value of G should be taken into account? (p. 
234) 
 
In part because, as Walton rightly points out, practical reasoning is most often (but 
not always)5 a defeasible form of reasoning (p. 198) the idea behind the critical 
questions is that they can point to weakness(es) in the reasoning; the better the 
answers to the questions, the stronger the evaluation. These questions become even 
more important when considering a concern Walton raises, but does not fully 
provide an answer to: “But what if the agent’s goal is antisocial, or represents 
something we would consider to be morally wrong? Can the action be positively 
evaluated as practically reasonable in such a case?” (p. 218) It seems as though the 
critical questions are designed in such a way as to safeguard against the agent 
reaching an “antisocial” or “morally wrong” conclusion. Indeed, Walton hints that 
this is the case when he describes value-based practical reasoning as an “ethical 
notion of practical reasoning, or at least a notion of practical reasoning that takes 
moral values into account.” (p. 218) On this account, if practical reasoning concludes 
in the decision to do something morally bad, then it cannot be evaluated as 
reasonable. Assuming this idea (that the immoral is unreasonable), the rest of this 
paper is thus devoted to exploring some aspects of what is involved in safeguarding 
and evaluating reasoning about actions to ensure unreasonable, morally bad 
decisions, are not made. 
To be clear, however, I do not wish to appear to be arguing that it is the case 
that immoral equals unreasonable. Rather I wish here to emphasise that the paper 
proceeds to attempt to answer the question if immoral equals unreasonable then to 
what extent do Walton’s critical questions safeguard against immoral conclusions? 
Although I am avoiding taking a hard stance on the issue at this point, it should also 
be noted that such a position does have merit and is not an empty assumption. One 
might challenge the assumption that immoral equals unreasonable by citing an 
instance of an immoral act that remains reasonable, for example, the oft cited case of 
                                                        
5 Strictly speaking, if the means are necessary, there is no need to consider alternatives; one can be 
considered to be normatively required to take the means (see Broome, 1999). In such cases, critical 
questions 3-5 do not need to be asked. But as an average person reasoning, asking these question will 
help determine and/or confirm if the means are necessary, if such information is not already certain.  
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a person who needs to steal medicine in order to save their own (or a loved one’s) 
life. Looking at this example from one view, stealing is immoral and thus this act is 
both reasonable and immoral. On another view, however, which will be addressed 
again below, stealing medicine in this case does not appear to be immoral. In short, 
if the action can be justified as reasonable then it can also be justified as moral. In 
this case then, stealing the medicine is not immoral in large part because it is 
reasonable and is based on a principle which could not be reasonably rejected. To be 
sure, stealing in other situations, which cannot be justified, can be considered 
immoral, but that does not make stealing immoral wholesale. Thus, although I am 
proceeding without taking a position on this issue, it seems plausible that what 
follows could be of value for those who have decided one way or the other. 
With this background and qualification in mind, I now turn to an application 
of Walton’s value-based practical reasoning scheme on a contemporary example of a 
clearly immoral decision to act. This is done in order to highlight some shortcomings 
and areas for further development, as well as to highlight the need for values to play 
a more central role in the evaluation of reasoning toward action.  
 
4. OSLO MASSACRE 
 
Anders Breivik’s bombing of a building in Oslo, Norway which killed 8 people and 
which was followed shortly after by his massacre of 69 others, mostly teenagers, on 
the nearby island of Utøya, can be considered a clear example of practical reasoning 
leading to a morally bad conclusion. As such, pretending we are Breivik before he 
commits these actions, we can hypothesise his line of reasoning and see if he could 
have followed the scheme for value-based reasoning and how he might have 
answered Walton’s critical questions. The strategy here is to show that if following 
the scheme and answering the critical questions means it is reasonable to accept the 
conclusion, then Breivik could be considered reasonable insofar as he is able to do 
so, but that there remains an importantly unreasonable aspect to his thinking. 
Applying this case to the scheme and questions will shed light on whether or not the 
critical questions are able to safeguard against immoral conclusions. 
 
Let’s suppose Breivik reasoned as follows:6 
 
I have a goal G. 
[I have a goal to prevent Norway from becoming more multicultural.] 
G is supported by my set of values, V.  
[Preventing Norway from becoming more multicultural is supported by 
my far-right militant values.] 
Bringing about A is necessary (or sufficient) for me to bring about G. 
                                                        
6 The above description and following hypothetical example of how Anders Breivik could have 
conducted his reasoning are based on a plethora of news reports and profiles found online. While it is 
acknowledged Breivik’s declared main motive for the atrocities was to market his “manifesto”, for 
simplicity, I have chosen to use what seems to be a main motivation for his creating the manifesto as 
his goal in this example. 
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[Killing the members at the youth camp contributes to preventing 
multiculturalism in Norway.] 
Therefore, I should (practically ought to) bring about A. 
[Therefore, I should (practically ought to) kill the members at the youth 
camp.]  
 
Further, let us suppose Breivik asks himself Walton’s critical questions: 
 
(CQ1) What other goals do I have that might conflict with G?  
[A: None.] 
 
(CQ2) How well is G supported by (or at least consistent with) my 
values V? 
[A: Very well.] 
 
(CQ3) What alternative actions to my bringing about A that would also 
bring about G should be considered? 
[A: Joining politics, writing a book, killing foreigners.] 
 
(CQ4) Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is 
arguably the best of the whole set, in light of considerations of 
efficiency in bringing about G? 
[A: Joining politics and writing a book take time and waiting for these to 
convince people of the benefits of preventing Norway from becoming 
more multicultural take too long for such an urgent problem. Killing 
foreigners only provides a temporary solution since more will be 
allowed in and as such it is not as efficient as stopping their entry by 
eliminating those who would continue to let them in. So, killing the 
members of the youth camp is best (most efficient) to bring about the 
prevention of Norway from becoming more multicultural.] 
 
(CQ5) Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is 
arguably the best of the whole set, in light of my values V?  
[A: My far-right militant values consider the presence of foreigners to be 
a most serious problem thus deserving of the most thorough solution. 
Killing the next generation of liberal leaders removes competition 
against future far-right leaders and is more likely to create a non-
multicultural state than writing a book, joining politics, or killing 
foreigners directly.] 
 
(CQ6) What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically 
possible for me to bring about A? 
[A: I have the courage and I am able to acquire a gun and police 
uniform.] 
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(CQ7) What consequences of my bringing about A that might have 
even greater negative value than the positive value of G should be 
taken into account? 
[A: The death of the children and adults and the pain it brings to others 
might be considered to have a greater value than stopping 
multiculturalism, but from my point of view, many more people will 
suffer in the long run if Norway becomes more multicultural.]   
 
5. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM: SOME DISTINCTIONS 
 
There are, obviously, a number of problems with the thinking presented above, not 
all of which can be addressed in this paper. The main point to be illustrated through 
this example is that Breivik, using Walton’s scheme and asking himself the 
accompanying critical questions, was still able to conclude to commit his heinous 
crimes. To make clearer sense of why this could happen, pointing to some specific 
problems and drawing some distinctions might help. 
The first problem to be mentioned is that the scheme and critical questions, 
as formulated, are focused on “my values”. But in this case, it seems “my values” are 
bad values. Importantly, there is no critical question that asks if my values are good 
values. So a first distinction could be made between good values and bad values and 
a second between my values and good values. 
Echoing an idea from Searle,7 some contemporary argumentation theorists 
stay away from evaluating values on the premise that it is reasonable that if 
“[c]onfronted with the same choice and even with exactly the same range of 
considerations, different people may arrive at different conclusions, depending on 
what they care about most, what hierarchies of goals and values they have, or what 
reasons matter comparatively more or override other reasons for them.” (Fairclough 
& Fairclough, 2012, p. 38) I am reminded here of an expression that a former 
professor of mine used to use, with which I tend to agree; “just because two people 
have an opinion, does not make them both right.” Similarly, perhaps, just because 
two people both have differing values, does not make them both right. This is most 
obvious in cases where what can be considered bad values are being promoted. A 
suggestion for how to deal with this problem will be presented in section 7. 
Perhaps the most obvious problem that stands out in the Breivik example is 
that he was not very critical of himself in his answers to the critical questions. In 
other words, there are more reasons against his proposed actions that could have 
been included in his answers. We might also argue that he did not give the 
appropriate weight to counter considerations that he should have, such as when he 
considered the deaths of his victims but outweighed them in his answer to CQ7. 
In regards to Breivik’s failure to come up with reasons against his proposed 
actions, if Breivik, left to his own devices, does not know of any objections to his 
                                                        
7 “Assume universally valid and accepted standards of rationality, assume perfectly rational agents 
operating with perfect information, and you will find that rational disagreement will still occur; 
because, for example, the rational agents are likely to have different and inconsistent values and 
interests, each of which may be rationally acceptable.” (Searle, 2001, p. xv) 
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position and thus does not raise them in his thinking, is it fair to attribute the title of 
“unreasonable” to his critical creative failure to 1. think up counter considerations 
and 2. attribute them what others would consider the proper weight? It seems a 
certain amount of self-criticism is to be expected, but it also seems problematic to 
determine how much. 
This point might be illustrated better through a comparison of two other 
examples. Pretend you are in a grocery store and see a box of cereal called Cocoa 
Krispies which has written on the front, “NOW HELPS SUPPORT YOUR CHILD’S 
IMMUNITY” and  “25% DAILY VALUE OF ANTIOXIDANTS & NUTRIENTS VITAMINS 
A, B, C & E”.8 Looking at the box you see a picture of brown coloured rice and reason 
- the cereal is made out of rice, rice is healthy, the box says it is part of a healthy 
breakfast, so the cereal is healthy. Perhaps using your critical creativity you even 
think the chocolate might deter from the healthiness of the cereal, but consider this 
outweighed by the fact that it is rice and the box at least implies it is healthy. Having 
the goal of buying a healthy cereal, you chose this one and are on your way. When 
you bring the cereal home, however, your spouse is quick to point out that cereal is 
in fact quite unhealthy. 
Compare this case with a case where you have recently moved to a big city 
after growing up on a farm in the country your whole life. To get to your new city 
job you take the bus every Monday to Friday. Although no schedule is posted at your 
bus stop, you notice through your travels that the bus passes every 15 minutes on 
the 15. One Saturday you are invited to a co-worker’s party who lives near your 
workplace. You leave your house at 10:10 aiming for the 10:15 bus, but the bus does 
not arrive until 11:00 because it only operates once an hour on the weekend. 
In the first case it seems intuitive (at least to me) to consider your conclusion 
that the cereal is healthy unreasonable. A little bit of critical thinking and 
investigation would surely point out that Chocoa Krispies are unhealthy. In the 
second example, however, it does not strike me as unreasonable to aim for the bus 
as though it departed every 15 minutes, even though the access to information is 
comparable with the cereal case (via a quick internet search).9  
Context here plays an important role. If, for example, part of the intuition of 
calling the cereal case unreasonable is the assumption that the reasoner has been a 
part of the culture (say Western) long enough that he should be sceptical of the 
writing on the front of the cereal box, then the absence of the scepticism seems 
unreasonable. What if, however, a non-Westerner (say, a tribal raised African) was 
in the same position? Pretend that she thinks “they have procedures and 
organizations here (in Europe/North America) ensuring the truth of the writing on 
these boxes, so it must true.” In such a case it seems that it would not be 
unreasonable to conclude the Chocoa Krispies are healthy. It is also, in part, because 
                                                        
8 This is a real cereal box. Taken from: http://trendsupdates.com/kelloggs-cereal-h1n1-immunity-
claim-misleading-advertisement-cashing-in-on-the-pandemic-paranoia-of-swine-flu/  
9 These concerns also apply to theoretical or belief reasoning. Compare forming the belief that 
Chocoa Krispies are healthy with forming the belief that the universe is expanding at a constant rate. 
Both are false and would only take a quick internet search to confirm. For the latter, for example, a 
Google search of “universe expansion” reveals enough to rebut the initial belief. 
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the former farmer was out of their element, having never been around a public 
transit system, which makes it seem unfair to call her ‘unreasonable’. Simply 
requiring that one consider the context, however, is vague and requires 
refinement.10 
As was mentioned in the introduction, if we had an infinite knowledge base 
and flawless reasoning, then both mistakes would have been avoided. Humans, 
however, are not perfectly rational and thus when determining what can be 
reasonably expected of us, it is important to find a way to gauge what average 
people should be expected to know, what a reasonable level of research is, and how 
they should be expected to apply their knowledge to their reasoning. 
In short, there is a tension that needs to be worked out. On the one hand, if 
you don’t know of any objection to your reasoning, it does not seem right to call 
your lack of including the objection unreasonable. On the other hand, a lack of 
knowledge does not always eliminate what seems to be an appropriate charge of 
being unreasonable. If, however, there is no way for the individual making the 
decision to have seen he was not considering something (perhaps due to an 
understandable lack of information) is it appropriate for him, or an external 
evaluator, to call the decision unreasonable? I refer to this as the problem of 
individual critical creativity. 
The problem of critical creativity might be handled by appeal to an outside 
evaluator. When it comes to practical reasoning, however, there seems to be a 
significant difference between an outside evaluator posing the critical questions, 
who has a second knowledge and value base to work from, and the reasoner 
attempting to answer the questions herself. Insofar as reasoning is personal and 
internal and argumentation is inter-subjective and external, Walton’s strategy is 
aimed at evaluating practical argumentation rather than practical reasoning. 
Further, if his goal is to protect against coming to a morally negative conclusion, it 
seems this is much more likely (but still not certain) to happen in an instance of 
inter-subjective communication between two or more interlocutors with differing 
value sets and knowledge bases. Left to reason, by oneself, however, it does not 
seem the critical questions force an independent reasoner to question the goodness 
of his or her values, goals, or means of achieving those goals forcefully enough to 
prevent morally bad conclusions.  
While ideally, it may be best to have another interlocutor to help evaluate 
your reasoning, there are many instances where we employ practical reasoning 
without such assistance. The suggestion that has been offered in such instances is to 
imagine another posing the critical questions. My concerns here is that I am not sure 
to what extent an individual reasoner (who most likely suffers from cognitive biases 
like the confirmation bias) would be able to imagine the knowledge base and critical 
creativity of another individual which is required to point out the flaws in their own 
reasoning. Thus, there is an important difference between attributing the title of 
reasonable to an individual’s practical reasoning without outside assistance and an 
individual’s reasoning that has been presented to another for scrutiny. 
                                                        
10 Work in this area is being developed. See Tindale (1999, p. 75-93) and van Eemeren (2011) for 
some important contributions. 
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The next important issue is that there seems to be two distinct points where 
Breivik is deserving of negative moral criticism, and thus also to the charge of being 
unreasonable. First, and most obviously, killing people (in this instance) is clearly 
morally wrong. Second, his goal in itself seems to me to be morally wrong.  
It is not always the case, however, that both the goal and means be morally 
wrong. There are some cases wherein one might have a morally good goal and 
morally bad means for achieving it. Consider for example, if I am on a tight budget 
but still want to give my partner a bouquet of flowers for our anniversary. In itself, 
the goal of giving flowers does not seem morally criticisable. If, however, in order to 
get enough money for the flowers I mug someone on the street, clearly the means 
are morally criticisable. Calling this whole line of thinking immoral or unreasonable 
without qualification seems incorrect. 
Making a clear distinction between the choosing of a goal and choosing the 
means to achieve the goal, we are able to be more precise regarding where the 
weakness in this reasoning lay.11 In this way, moral goodness, or at least neutrality, 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for being reasonable. For the goal 
and/or the means, moral goodness is necessary because if one or the other is not 
good we cannot call this whole line of reasoning taken together, reasonable. But if 
the goal and the means are both good, it might still be unreasonable. Returning to 
the flower example, if I am on a tight budget and but still choose to buy my partner a 
$200 dollar bouquet of flowers for our anniversary, when I know of a place to get 
the same bouquet for $100, although the action is good, and even the means do not 
seem morally objectionable, it still strikes me as unreasonable to pay the higher 
price. 
To summarize, analyzing how Breivik might have been able to reason to an 
immoral conclusion has revealed tensions regarding 1) good values and bad values, 
2)  acceptable and unacceptable levels of an individual’s critical creative capacity, 3) 
self-reasoning evaluation and the external evaluation of reasoning, and 4) goal 
selection and means reasoning. 
 
6. FAIRCLOUGH AND FAIRCLOUGH 
 
Isabela and Norman Fairclough have very recently (2012) made significant 
advancements regarding the characterization and evaluation of practical reasoning. 
In their proposal for analysing the structure of practical reasoning they generally 
share many of the concerns I have raised above. For each agreement, however, we 
also have some aspects of disagreement. 
The first point of agreement is that we are both concerned with the 
reasonable rather than the ideal. Our disagreement here, which frames the rest of 
our disagreements, is that for them a dialectical method (predominantly the pragma 
dialectical method) is the test of reasoning’s reasonableness; regardless of the 
conclusion, if the reasoner has followed a reasonable procedure, they have come to 
as reasonable a conclusion as can be had. For reasons mentioned above and that will 
                                                        
11 Walton describes the two as intertwined. See: (Walton, 2007 p. 201). 
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become clearer below, I find this method incomplete for evaluating independent 
reasoning. It is much more effective applied to situations with two interlocutors but 
is fundamentally lacking when transcribed on to independent reasoning. 
Our second point of agreement concerns the observation that the quality of 
practical reasoning depends on a critical creative capacity. Fairclough and 
Fairclough explain that, “practical reasoning involves an imaginative effort to think 
of as many considerations that might have a bearing on the situation as possible.” (p. 
35) Elaborating on this idea they argue,   
 
How well this claim for action is supported will depend on how a certain person will 
weigh these reasons together and how thoroughly and imaginatively she will explore 
as many relevant considerations as possible, including different and possibly 
conflicting goals, likely consequences, moral implications, different 
conceptualizations of the context of action, coherence with an overall plan of action, 
including a broad life plan, and so on. (p. 38: Italics mine) 
 
However, the “and so on” here is telling. This phrase is required because of 
the difficulty of determining which considerations should be taken into account and 
to what extent. But importantly, as Fairclough and Fairclough mention, how well the 
claim in practical reasoning is supported depends on just these considerations. In 
other words, an answer to the question, “when is it clear that a person has been as 
creatively critical in evaluating their practical reasoning as is reasonable” seems 
necessary for any sufficient evaluation of reasoning.12 Despite this 
acknowledgement, however, they do not explicitly offer a suggestion for how to 
evaluate the thoroughness of the use of imagination or highlight the need for one. 
The third general point of agreement is that there is a difference between 
independent practical reasoning and reasoning with another. They frame the 
difference in terms of deliberation:  
 
Deliberation involves therefore considering alternative practical arguments 
supporting different claims and examining and weighing considerations that support 
these alternative claims. This is what agents deliberating together are doing. But this 
is what agents reasoning practically on their own are often doing, when they are 
trying to make a reasonable decision by considering reasons that support various 
possible courses of action, or count against the proposal they originally thought of. 
(p. 50) 
 
To come to a reasonable conclusion, what an individual practical reasoner “can do is 
subject these alternatives to thorough criticism in an attempt to find reasons against 
the proposed course of action (not reasons in favour), and thus eliminate the worst 
alternatives.” (p. 49) In order to perform this self-directed criticism they suggest 
that “…the agent will examine these proposals critically by using the relevant 
theoretical (e.g. scientific, empirical) knowledge at his disposal.”(p. 49) As has been 
                                                        
12 One way to approach this problem might be to come up with a list of requirements or steps that a 
reasoner must have gone through in order to have been said to have used their critical creativity 
thoroughly. Such a list, however, would still not address how to evaluate how well the steps have 
been completed. 
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shown above, however, evaluating how well he has done so, is far from 
straightforward. First, it is not at all clear what can be considered knowledge at his 
disposal. Second, it is unclear how he can evaluate whether or not he has attributed 
the appropriate weight to the knowledge that he has. Third, there is no clear 
indication pointing to when he has been reasonably critically creative, i.e., what 
constitutes having been thoroughly imaginative. With a second interlocutor with a 
separate knowledge and value base, these problems are easier to resolve. In such an 
instance, however, I suggest we are dealing with practical argumentation rather 
than practical reasoning. An evaluation of practical reasoning, then, can be related 
to, but must also differ in important respects from, a dialectical evaluation of 
practical argumentation.  
 This importance is highlighted when considering an individual reasoner 
dealing with bad moral values. For Fairclough & Fairclough (2012), “any moral 
value (or institutional fact, such as promises) has to be internalized by the agent as a 
concern in order to actually motivate his action (in order for the agent to actually do 
the action). But even when the agent is not concerned to act morally (or fulfil his 
promises), moral values, duties, commitments, norms and other such reasons are 
still there, as external reasons which the agent has, even if he chooses not to be 
concerned with their realization.” (p. 48) This distinction characterises their 
observation that values often move us to act even if they are not values we desire to 
stick to, that is, hold internally. For example, if we make a promise, but later 
determine it is to our advantage not to keep it, the fact that a promise has been 
made, and keeping one’s promise is a socially recognized value, means it is an 
external reason to keep the promise anyway. They account for such external 
reasons as institutional facts although also note that acting on external reasons 
means that to some degree the reasoner accepts their force, that is, internalizes it to 
whatever minor degree. Making such a distinction could appear to be coming close 
to moral relativism insofar as only one’s own values can motivate one to act and 
there are multitudes of seemingly equally reasonable values. 
They are careful, however, to distance themselves from moral relativism. 
They state, “not all value pluralism is reasonable: a racist argument about how to 
deal politically with an ethnic minority can be conclusively rejected by questioning 
its various premises, and its proponent cannot defend himself by invoking value 
pluralism or his legitimate right to differ.” (p. 59) Again, however, given the tools on 
offer, this conclusive rejection is not guaranteed for an independent resoner. This 
points to the idea that practical reasoning is not conclusively rejected by 
“questioning its various premises” but more importantly by appreciating the weight 
of the critical answers to the questions. Of course, without questions it is tough to 
come up with answers, but questions themselves are not sufficient to counter 
practical reasoning, the answers are at least equally as important. Also, what those 
important answers consist of will differ dramatically between an independent 
reasoner and an external evaluator especially in matters where there is a difference 
regarding their views on moral goodness.  
Turning to their strategy for evaluation, the fourth point of general 
agreement is that we share the view that “being able to defeat an argument is much 
less significant than being able to rebut its claim, given that a claim can be true or 
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false independently of the quality of the argument that allegedly supports it.” (p. 48) 
The point of agreement here is that, as was mentioned above, when evaluating 
practical reasoning, we can look at the moral quality of the goal and means 
separately. In many cases, but not all, if the goal can be determined to be morally 
bad, then there is no need to evaluate the means. For example, if it can be shown 
that I ought not to kill some specific person, then there is no need to further evaluate 
my proposed means for how I planned to kill them.  
Expanding on this view, the most unique part of Fairclough and Fairclough’s 
position is in their suggestion that, “whether the argument itself is valid or not does 
not ultimately matter. The one thing that matters is whether the conclusion is true 
or not, and it is only examination of the consequences of action and their impact on 
goals that agents are otherwise committed to that can rebut the conclusion.” (p. 65) 
To assess the truth of the conclusion they suggest that, “questioning whether the 
action being proposed will have negative consequences that will undermine the 
stated goal (or other goals the agent wants to pursue, or other agents’ goals) is the 
only really interesting critical question, as it is the only one that can rebut the 
argument’s claim (and also defeat the argument’s validity).” (pp. 63-64)  
I have some reservations regarding this further elaboration. While it seems 
that in most cases a goal can be assessed independently, and takes priority, in some 
cases, it ought to be assessed while also considering the argument. For example, if 
Breivik reasoned, “I have a goal to prevent Norway from becoming more 
multicultural. To prevent multiculturalism I am going to donate and volunteer in poor 
countries so that foreigners will feel more comfortable at home and not want to move 
to Norway”, it is not clear that the consequences of the claim can be assessed 
separately from the argument. Following Fairclough and Fairclough, it seems as 
though they are suggesting that once we have determined that preventing Norway 
from becoming more multicultural is bad, we do not have to evaluate any further. 
Thus, as was mentioned above, it is important to assess the moral quality of both the 
goal and the means separately rather than just the goal or the entire argument taken 
together.  
Regardless, following this line of thought they suggest three further critical 
questions: 1. “Are the values that underlie the action rationally acceptable 
(Acceptable Value Question)”, 2. “Should the agent consider other values? (Other 
Values Question)”, and 3. “Do the stated values conflict with other values of the 
agent (Agent’s Multiple Values Question).” (p. 67) Taken together, these questions 
put values in the limelight of practical reasoning evaluation. We are left to consider 
then if using these questions would force an independent reasoner to avoid a 
morally bad conclusion. It does not seem so. Breivik could understandably answer 
the first question with a “Yes”, insofar as he does not think he is irrational for 
holding the values he does. The second question could be answered with a 
“Perhaps”, but it is not clear which other values he would consider or what weight 
he would attribute to them. The third question, especially because it does not 
mention other agents (although other agents were mentioned elsewhere), could 
also be answered with a “No”. 
While these specific questions do not solve the problem, Fairclough and 
Fairclough seem to be on the right track in their ideas more generally. For example, 
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following their advice that, “if an action undermines the goal of action, then it should 
not be performed. Similarly, if an action leads to the goal stated in the goal premise 
(is sufficient) but has negative consequences on other goals that are important to 
the agent or to other agents, then again it might be wise not to go ahead with the 
action”(p. 66). Breivik might have been forced to conclude that his goal, or at least 
his means, have negative consequences on other agents’ goals (insofar as he 
recognizes them as agents) and thus stop himself from reaching the conclusion to 
perform the actions he concluded to perform. 
Considering the negative consequences on other agent’s goals does not seem 
to work, however, for a more general form of practical reasoning evaluation. 
Consider the common case of wanting to criminalise gun use. On one hand the 
positive consequence of fewer deaths as a result of gun violence is reasonable, but 
insofar as it has the negative consequence of preventing other agents from achieving 
their legitimate goal of protecting themselves, “it might not be wise to go ahead with 
the action.” 
If their position is taken to address a more explicit moral requirement, rather 
than an ability to undermine, then I do not agree, however, that the only test of 
moral goodness is consequentialist. Say for example that my goal is to steal $100 
dollars from a very rich person whom I know will not even notice it is gone. Just 
because the consequences of stealing the money benefit me and do not harm the 
person I am stealing from, does not, to me, indicate that stealing this money is a 
morally good or reasonable thing to do. 
Finally, returning to the additional critical questions they propose, (Are the 
values that underlie the action rationally acceptable?, Should the agent consider 
other values?, Do the stated values conflict with other values of the agent?), when 
“rationally acceptable” means avoiding “negative consequences that will undermine 
the stated goal (or other goals the agent wants to pursue, or other agents’ goals)”, it 
is unclear why the moral language of negative consequences is being evaluated with 
the logical language of rationality and acceptability. A more consistent and to the 
point question would be “Are the values that underlie the action good?” Asking a 
question about the moral goodness of a line of reasoning or an argument might 
appear to be outside the job of a reasoning and/or argumentation scholar. This 
could be in part because it is not their specialty to define what is morally good. 
There is, however, one view offered by T.M. Scanlon that could be seen as a way to 
shrink the gulf between these two disciplines. This suggestion is the topic of the 
following section. Before turning to that discussion, however, a summary of the 
observations from this section is in order. 
In sum, Fairclough and Fairclough provide important observations and 
developments for the evaluation of practical reasoning especially by 1. focusing on 
the reasonable, 2. taking critical creativity into account, 3. addressing differences 
concerning independent practical reasoning and practical reasoning with another, 4. 
noting that defeating the conclusion of practical reasoning carries more weight than 
defeating the argument, 5. arguing that additional critical questions are required 
and that these question need to highlight the role of values in the evaluation of 
practical reasoning. The main problem, it seems to me, is that the observations they 
make when discussing the structure and analysis of practical reasoning are not fully 
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accounted for in their suggestions for how to evaluate it. A future paper contributing 
to this development would be highly beneficial. For now, however, I would like to 
return to topic of evaluating the moral as a part of the reasonable. 
 
7. DOING THE RIGHT THING 
 
I hope to have shown that practical reasoning evaluation strategies that highlight 
moral quality are thus needed, especially for independent instances of practical 
reasoning, if we are to reserve the title of “reasonable” for only those instances that 
conclude in morally neutral or positive conclusions. One remaining problem is to 
determine which moral theory is best able to demarcate instances of right and 
wrong. 
One approach comes from T.M Scanlon (1998). Understanding “a reason for 
something” as “a consideration that counts in favor of it,” (p. 17) Scanlon asserts 
that an action is morally right if  it is “permitted by principles that could not 
reasonably be rejected, by people who were moved to find principles for the general 
regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject.” 
(p. 4) Put more simply, an action is right if it is based on a principle which cannot be 
reasonably rejected. Speaking of right and wrong actions in this way ties the 
reasonable together with the moral.  
Using this guideline we can form a new critical question and sub-question for 
independent practical reasoning: “is my goal permitted by a principle that could not 
reasonably be rejected?” and if so “are the means to achieving my goal based on a 
principle that could not reasonably be rejected?” Applied to Breivik, he could ask 
himself, 1. “is preventing Norway from becoming more multicultural permitted by 
principles that could not be reasonably rejected, by people who were moved to find 
principles for the general regulation of behaviour that others, similarly motivated, 
could not reasonably reject?” If he came to a “No” answer he might conclude his 
potential act is immoral and unreasonable and stop there. If somehow he came to a 
“Yes” answer, he could still ask himself the sub-question, “are the actions, the 
bombing of a building and execution of campers on Utøya island, justifiable based on 
principles that others could not reasonably reject given that they want to find 
principles for the general regulation of behavior?” Even if Breivik found a way to 
answer the first question positively, I do not think he could find a way to answer the 
second question positively. 
This is only one approach and others may fair better than Scanlon’s. The 
main point here is that there are theories on offer which attempt to merge reasoning 
and morals that argumentation and reasoning scholars might benefit from. In other 
words, perhaps addressing morals in what is expected of someone who can be 
considered “reasonable” might not be entirely out of the scope or responsibility of 
reasoning and argumentation scholars and experts. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has focused on the evaluation of practical reasoning in light of the goal of 
coming to a reasonable conclusion. Picking up on a concern raised by Walton, that 
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there seems to be something unreasonable about immoral practical reasoning 
conclusions, I have tried to argue that the critical questions offered thus far, meant 
to safeguard practical reasoning from reaching immoral conclusions, do not seem 
sufficient to do so. Using an example of how Anders Breivik could have conducted 
his reasoning, I have tried to show that immoral reasoning can still occur in spite of 
the current critical questions on offer. 
Building on the idea that immoral conclusions are unreasonable, I have 
argued that part of evaluating practical reasoning requires determining to what 
extent an individual is expected to be creatively critical. I have also argued that 
centralizing the role of values in the evaluation of practical reasoning is integral to 
protecting against immoral conclusions and preserving reasonableness. One way to 
do so is to ask about the moral status of both the goal, and means to achieve the 
goal, by directly asking if they are good; in other words, to highlight the role of 
values in the evaluation of practical reasoning. Importantly, I have suggested that an 
adequate answer to the question must consider the goodness of the action beyond 
the values of the agent doing the reasoning so that if my values are bad values this 
weakness is pointed out. As a suggestion for how to determine if an action is morally 
good, I have pointed to Scanlon’s suggestion that an action is good if it is based on a 
principle which cannot be reasonably rejected. One problem that would remain to 
be resolved if Scanlon’s approach were employed, however, would be that his 
suggestion still leaves questions pertaining to an individual’s critical creative 
capacity unresolved and in need of further investigation. In other words, even if 
Scanlon is right, we still have to determine to what extent we should expect 
someone to be able to creatively come up with what others could reasonably reject. 
A further study leaning on literature from critical thinking might try to fill this gap.  
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